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Interview 
A CONVERSATION WITH  
JUDGE RICHARD A. POSNER 
Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
is one of the most prominent members of the federal judiciary and one 
of its most prolific writers. His nonjudicial writings address diverse and 
timely issues, including terrorism,1 sex,2 antitrust,3 intelligence,4 the 
Bush v. Gore controversy,5 the legitimacy of moral reasoning,6 from a 
law and economics viewpoint that has evolved over the years to a 
broader pragmatic perspective. 
In 2008, he turned his attention to judges and how they do their 
jobs. Judge Posner’s book, How Judges Think,7 takes up the prevailing 
theories about what motivates judges’ decisions and adds his own, 
heavily grounded in the notion that judges’ experiences and 
backgrounds play a large role where decision outcomes are uncertain. 
Judges—at least the vast majority—are pragmatists, seeking to 
maximize various goals within a legal tradition that imposes its own 
vision of what it is to be a “good judge.” 
In November 2008, Judge Posner sat down for an interview with a 
class on the study of judicial behavior at Duke Law School. The class, 
led by Professor Mitu Gulati and Dean David Levi, had read the book 
as part of a year-long review of the empirical literature on judicial 
decisionmaking. Their conversation ranged over various topics, 
including reaction to the book, Posner’s experience as a judge, and 
future directions for empirical studies of the judiciary. 
 
 1. RICHARD A. POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM: BLURRED FOCUS, HALTING STEPS 
(2007). 
 2. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992). 
 3. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001). 
 4. RICHARD A. POSNER, REMAKING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE (2005). 
 5. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001). 
 6. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999). 
 7. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008). 
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QUESTION: I am curious about the feedback you received from 
judges on your book. Are they hostile to the idea of studying judges? 
Given the provocative title and subject matter, I’m guessing that there 
must have been much discussion of your book in the judicial 
community. 
JUDGE POSNER: I have received very little feedback from judges. I 
don’t think that judges do much reading—at least, not much 
secondary reading. The ordinary judicial job itself requires a great 
amount of reading. Most judges probably figure that that is enough. 
I have personal friends whom I have talked to about these issues; 
people like Michael Boudin and Steve Breyer. But generally the 
judicial community is not like the academic community. Judges, my 
sense is, do not spend a great deal of time reflecting about what they 
do and why they do it in the ways that they do it. Think about 
continuing legal education for judges. It tends to be vocational. There 
will be lectures about particular substantive areas of law, but rarely, if 
ever, will there be lectures or discussions of the research on the study 
of judges. 
QUESTION: Our impression is that at least some judges are familiar 
with the portion of your book that tackles the question of whether 
judicial salaries should be raised. At least one of them suggested you 
were perhaps not as concerned about an increased salary because of 
the large amount of money you likely make from royalties on your 
books. Is that the case? 
JUDGE POSNER [chuckling]: I’m sorry that my views on the salary 
question displeased some. I don’t make very much at all in terms of 
royalties on my books. They are not big sellers. And I don’t write 
them in the hope of making royalties. It is just mainly academic 
writing. 
QUESTION: Who was your intended audience for the book? 
JUDGE POSNER: Most people write for themselves. Academic writing, 
which is what this was, is not focused on an audience. I try to write 
very simply. Beyond that, I don’t have a precise sense of audience. 
Maybe law professors, law students, and political scientists. Not much 
more than that. I didn’t expect judges to be that interested. 
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QUESTION: I’d like to ask about the “good judge” concept. The book 
attaches a great deal of weight to that concept. When we see judges 
acting outside acceptable bounds, is that because the good judge 
conception has failed to constrain? 
JUDGE POSNER: I don’t think many judges are cynical. I don’t think 
many would say, “I will do something different from what I am 
supposed do as a judge because I can get away with it.” But that is 
true in all jobs. If serious, the job holder tries to do a good job. If a 
judge goes out of bounds, it might be because he thinks it is terribly 
important to do so. The job description is sufficiently loose. You can 
do a lot. 
Judge Reinhardt, on the Ninth Circuit, for example, is a very 
smart judge with a terrible reversal rate at the Supreme Court. But he 
ploughs ahead. He does not have that much respect for the Supreme 
Court. But he does not think of himself as an irresponsible judge. On 
the Supreme Court, there were judges like Blackmun and Douglas 
who pushed at the boundaries. Douglas, he really pushed the 
envelope. 
QUESTION: In the first part of your book you focus on how judges—
mostly federal circuit judges—make decisions as whole human beings, 
not just political actors. But in the second half of the book you turn to 
the Supreme Court, and you treat the Justices as purely political 
decisionmakers. Is there a reason for this discrepancy, and do you 
think it would make sense to apply your analysis in the first part of 
the book to the Court? 
JUDGE POSNER: There are two ways in which personality affects 
Supreme Court Justices. The first has to do with temperament. Take, 
for example, Blackmun. He was very emotional. Much of what he did 
resulted from his emotional reactions to cases. O’Connor, in turn, was 
very offended by how she was treated by Scalia. 
The second way has to do with the differential preference for 
rules and standards. Some want rules and others care less about those 
rules. Breyer is clearly more comfortable with loose standards. In the 
Eldred8 case, for example, the Supreme Court said in effect that 
“limited times” just meant short of infinite. Breyer wanted instead a 
 
 8. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
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loose multifactor test. Well, that sort of thing, I suspect, drives folks 
like Scalia and Thomas crazy because of the amount of discretion that 
such a test would give judges. But I don’t think that the tight rules 
that the rule lovers want to adopt have any more fixity. No one has 
done a study that tells us which works better at governing behavior. 
Temperament affects people and so does politics. Judges are no 
different. 
QUESTION: What are your own political preferences? 
JUDGE POSNER: I cannot talk about my party-based political 
affiliations. That isn’t appropriate for me to do as a judge. On my 
general political philosophy, as distinct from my preferences for any 
politician or political-party platform: I started out liberal, but became 
more and more conservative first during the turmoil of the late 1960s, 
which I found extremely repulsive, and then when I started meeting 
economists like Stigler and Coase and Friedman. I am less 
dogmatically conservative today, for example, on environmental (e.g., 
global warming) matters. I was never a social or religious 
conservative. 
QUESTION: Is it true that you were a registered Democrat when 
President Reagan nominated you to the bench? 
JUDGE POSNER: Yes, but only because I wanted to vote in the 
Democratic primary for a friend. It was not an issue that came up 
during the confirmation process. 
QUESTION: By the time you were nominated, you had already written 
a number of provocative articles, including some that articulated 
views on judicial behavior and one especially controversial one on the 
market for babies. Did you get questioned about your research? 
JUDGE POSNER: No, not at all. There were some pleasantries 
exchanged, but that was it. 
QUESTION: In recent years, there appears to be have been greater 
scrutiny applied to judicial nominees, particularly for the Supreme 
Court. What do you think the effect of that greater scrutiny has been? 
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JUDGE POSNER: There has been greater scrutiny. More scrutiny has 
resulted in candidates with better professional credentials. Take the 
Harriet Miers affair. The Justice Department, I suspect, thought that 
she was not adequately prepared to answer questions at the hearings. 
The senators have staff who prepare tough questions for the 
nominees. But the senators don’t know how to follow up on the 
question that someone else created. The result is that if you are adept 
like Roberts, you can get away with not answering the question. He 
got away with saying things like that stuff about balls and strikes.9 
But even though we have more qualified judges, it is not clear 
that the output is better as a result. They have better staff these days 
too and a lighter workload. Still, why isn’t there better output? There 
hasn’t been any actual improvement in the opinions. Take the Heller10 
case on the right to bear arms. Scalia and Stevens produced opinions 
that are dazzling as research products. There were lots of citations to 
esoteric material. But there was no real improvement in the value of 
the opinion. At the end of the day, it may not be really that important 
to have judges with better qualifications. 
QUESTION: What got you interested in being a judge? Our sense is 
that your career, at the time you became a judge, could have easily 
gone in a different direction, with all the success that your consulting 
firm Lexecon was having and the demand for your advice in antitrust 
cases. 
JUDGE POSNER: I had no interest in being a judge until I received a 
call in June 1981 from a friend in the Justice Department who asked 
me if I would consider an appointment to the Seventh Circuit. I said 
of course not, but then I said give me twenty-four hours to think it 
over, and after discussing it with my father and my wife and a few 
others I decided to do it. Partly because I was enthusiastic about 
advancing economics-oriented thinking in the judiciary, I felt that I 
shouldn’t turn down the opportunity. And in part I thought it would 
basically just replace consulting and some teaching and law school 
 
 9. In his confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Chief Justice 
Roberts explained his belief in judicial restraint by analogizing the role of a judge to that of an 
umpire in a baseball game—the umpire’s job is to call balls and strikes, whereas the pitcher and 
batter play the game. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be 
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
 10. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
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committee work, so that I would have as much time for academic 
research and writing as before—and that turned out to be true. The 
consulting was lucrative, so my income plunged, but my wife didn’t 
care, so neither did I, and I found consulting rather dull. I was the 
head of Lexecon and the business getter, so a lot of what I did was 
explaining what the firm did and some elementary principles of 
economics and how they could help in litigation. And finally, I 
thought writing judicial opinions would be fun, as it turned out to be. 
QUESTION: Whom did you talk to about your appointment, and what 
did they think—particularly your father who was very liberal? 
JUDGE POSNER: My father was pretty apolitical. He was a lawyer and 
thought it a great thing to be a judge. I also spoke to a former boss of 
mine whom I greatly respected, Philip Elman, a Federal Trade 
Commissioner—later in practice—and he reacted as my father had 
done. 
QUESTION: Is it true that you require that your law clerks call you 
“Dick” and not “Judge”? We have heard that this annoys some of the 
other judges, who think it is important they be referred to as 
“judge”—that helps keep a distance between them and the others. 
JUDGE POSNER: It is true that I ask my clerks to call me “Dick” 
rather than “Judge.” There is a practical reason for this. I need my 
clerks to be candid with me and tell me when I have made mistakes. 
Forbidding them to be formal encourages them to be completely 
forthright and candid in the expression of their views. I cannot get my 
secretary to call me by my first name though. I tried repeatedly, but 
failed. 
I also tell my law clerks: “Look, when you read this draft 
opinion, you may start out assuming that it will be good. Don’t do 
that. I want you to presume error in tone, style, analysis, logic and so 
on.” I need my law clerks to tell me where there are errors because 
there are bound to be some. 
QUESTION: We were wondering whether you meant for the book to 
describe how you and other judges judge or to say how they should 
judge. In particular, is there a message to law students about how we 
should think about law or judges? 
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JUDGE POSNER: I certainly intended to be descriptive. But judges 
need to be aware that the legalistic approach11 can sometimes take 
one to the wrong place or, at least, not very far. The legalistic 
approach has become more popular and I suspect it relates to the way 
law is taught these days. 
QUESTION: Could you talk a little bit about the implications of what 
you say in the book for law schools? It seemed like you didn’t think 
that law schools did a terribly good job of bridging the gap between 
the judiciary and academia. How can law schools go about fixing the 
problem? 
JUDGE POSNER: There are two separate questions. First, what role 
should law professors and law students play in criticizing judges and 
what they do? Second, what is the role of the legal academy in 
monitoring and evaluating judicial performance? And relatedly, what 
should be done in developing criteria of evaluation? 
In terms of the measures being used to evaluate judicial 
performance by academics, like number of citations and number of 
cases reprinted in casebooks and reversal rate, the problem is in 
coming up with weights to give the different measures. The weighting 
that is done ends up being arbitrary. But the project is a good one, if 
the weighting problem can be solved. 
But the criticism of opinions is not terribly useful. Judges don’t 
pay a lot of attention to these critiques. They don’t think law 
professors are giving them much in the way of useful, constructive 
criticism. And it is not that useful to be looking backwards at errors in 
past opinions. By the time a judge reads a law review article 
criticizing or analyzing an opinion of his, it is likely that a lot of time 
has gone by since the opinion was written. Happy judges don’t want 
to look back at their mistakes. Of my 2,500 or so opinions, a number 
 
 11. Judge Posner explains that legalism is a theory of judicial decisionmaking in which the 
judge lacks discretion, as doctors treat an illness: 
The treatment decisions of physicians are determined . . . by the physicians’ 
understanding of the structure of the physical world, and the aspiration of the legalist 
is that a judicial decision be determined by a body of rules constituting “the law” 
rather than by factors that are personal to judges, in the sense of varying among them, 
such as ideology, personality, and personal background. The ideal legalist decision is 
the product of a syllogism in which a rule of law supplies the major premise, the facts 
of the case supply the minor one, and the decision is the conclusion. 
POSNER, supra note 7, at 41. 
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are doubtless wrong. If I brooded over all the mistakes in those 
opinions, I’d be unhappy. Who wants that? 
I had a case that involved bits and pieces of evidence of 
discrimination. I talked about the “mosaic of discrimination.”12 Years 
later, I realized that a “mosaic” rule had emerged. But that was 
ridiculous. You don’t need a mosaic.13 Judges love clichés. They are 
always grasping at clichés. 
Law professors are not performing the service for the judiciary 
that they used to. We still have a common law system and law 
professors used to perform a useful function in cleaning up and 
clarifying the array of cases that emerged from the courts. Treatises 
were useful and so were restatements. They identified and dispatched 
outlier cases and created a coherent body of law. That was the kind of 
work that engaged the leading academics. 
Today, the leading academics do not see intellectual profit in 
writing a treatise or a restatement. Today, cutting-edge law articles 
use social science. They draw from fields like psychology, economics, 
et cetera. They don’t work with doctrine as much. Much of the 
current academic publishing ends up being too academic and esoteric. 
As for the restatements and treatises today, they are competent. But 
the work of producing them is not engaging the leading academics 
any longer. 
QUESTION: In light of the motivations for your book, do you have any 
advice for law students who are about to go into practice? 
JUDGE POSNER: With regard to trial lawyers, I have little to say. 
There are good and bad trial lawyers. One of the defining 
characteristics of good trial lawyers is that they are well organized. I 
used to teach a course on evidence combined with trial advocacy. My 
experience was that the rules of evidence were useless. First, I notice 
from my forays into the district court as a volunteer trial judge that 
 
 12. Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736–37 (7th Cir. 1994) (allowing a case to 
survive summary judgment because the plaintiff presented a “combination of ambiguous 
statements, suspicious timing, discrimination against other employees, and other pieces of 
evidence none conclusive in itself but together composing a convincing mosaic of discrimination 
against the plaintiff”). 
 13. See Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 904 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[I]t 
was not the intention in Troupe to promulgate a new standard, whereby circumstantial evidence 
in a discrimination or retaliation case must, if it is to preclude summary judgment for the 
defendant, have a mosaic-like character.”). 
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the lawyers who do not make any (or at least make very, very few) 
objections often won. This makes sense because the jury draws 
negative inferences from objections that are sustained. I also found 
that with most evidentiary objections, the lawyer could just rephrase 
the question and the objection would disappear. An evidence class 
really should be about trial advocacy. That is, about how to get the 
evidence you need into the case. Students in the class would play 
different roles in our mock trials. I really enjoyed this. 
As for materials, NITA, the National Institute of Trial Advocacy, 
prepares case files. I used those. They are brilliantly done materials—
realistic trial simulations. What I noticed was that some students had 
an uncanny knack for the courtroom. Others, who might have done 
well on an exam, were not able to tackle the courtroom. Beyond 
personality, those who are organized do better, as I said. 
In appellate practice, the lawyers are often quite bad, sometimes 
awful. I don’t understand why. I sometimes wonder whether there is 
an oxygen deficiency in the courtroom. I sometimes become 
exasperated. I’ll give you an example. We have a red light that goes 
on at the end of the time given for oral argument. Last week, we had 
an argument and the light went on. I had another question for the 
lawyer, though, and I asked it. He asked for permission to answer. 
That was ridiculous. I had just asked him the question! And then it 
happened a second and third time during the same set of oral 
arguments; a question would be asked after the red light went on and 
the lawyer would ask for permission to answer. By the third time, it 
became truly stupid. Why were the lawyers spending their time on 
this red-light nonsense? 
One of the other things they do that is frustrating has to do with 
leaving time for rebuttal. If you don’t leave yourself time for rebuttal, 
the other guy can say anything. It is nuts not to leave some time for 
rebuttal, but lawyers will often use up their time. I end up often giving 
them some time anyway. 
In making their arguments, too often the lawyers try to hammer 
us by citing opinions—X v. Y, A v. B, and so on. I try to tell them not 
to bother us with all these citations. It is unlikely that some prior 
opinion will completely decide the case. It is too difficult to map on 
the facts of some other case exactly. And the lawyers don’t seem to 
understand that we are not specialists—we don’t spend that much 
time analyzing those prior cases. 
I had a case last month that centered on a telecommunications 
issue. I read the briefs and didn’t understand what was going on at all. 
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So, when the case was argued, I asked for a simple explanation of 
what was going on. The same lawyer who had submitted an 
incomprehensible brief was able to explain the issue in five minutes.  
It’s as if lawyers had absolutely no conception about the 
conditions under which judges work. We don’t know that much in the 
first place and we don’t spend that much time preparing for the 
individual case. 
Maybe all this is the result of the growing gap between practice 
and the academy. Why can’t the lawyers recognize what kinds of 
constraints judges operate under? 
Last month, I heard a big criminal case. Lots of money was at 
stake. After making his argument, one of the lawyers was walking 
away from the podium and he swung around and made a motion. It 
was so strange. He could have submitted a written motion after the 
argument. I ignored the oral motion. I’m not sure the other judges on 
the panel even heard it. 
QUESTION: I’m interested on your view about how judges should 
tackle the inevitable empirical questions that arise at trial. Should 
judges confine themselves to the empirical evidence that the parties 
bring to the case in their briefs? Or should they be allowed to go 
beyond the briefs and recognize empirical realities about the world or 
about how individuals respond to incentives and so on? 
JUDGE POSNER: My focus in the book is on appellate judges. I do find 
trials interesting though. I often volunteer to sit on the district court 
for trials. I typically do not do criminal cases because I am 
uncomfortable with having to do criminal sentencing because that is 
something that the district judges receive extensive instructions 
about, and we appellate judges do not. But I thoroughly enjoy the 
civil trials. Over my twenty-seven years of doing these trials, I have 
continued to enjoy doing them. 
One question that comes up all the time is whom to believe. 
Empirical judgments about the world inevitably come into play here. 
With a criminal trial, I imagine that different judges have different 
judgments about whether they are inclined to believe the cops or the 
defendant. I know that when judges make these empirical judgments, 
they are reacting to their own experiences. They are driven by their 
preconceptions, their experiences, to a very great extent. 
POSNER IN FINAL FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:33:05 PM 
2009] CONVERSATION WITH JUDGE POSNER 1817 
QUESTION: I think we agree.14 So much of law is about facts about 
institutions. When we think a court is wrong, it is often that we think 
it has erred about institutional facts. When I was a judge in California, 
I worked on an open primary case. It was likely to get appealed no 
matter what we decided at the lower level. So, we tried to take 
enough evidence at the trial so as to give the appeals court an 
adequate factual basis from which to work, to make its decision. The 
district court has the mechanisms and tools to develop facts. The 
appeals court is limited in this respect; its hands are tied in terms of 
the facts. 
JUDGE POSNER: When the appeals court finds itself with inadequate 
facts, which is not infrequently, the lawyers are partially at fault as 
well. I am distressed at the poor job that lawyers do in terms of giving 
us facts. Lawyers don’t help us enough in helping us get to sensible 
decisions. 
I wrote the opinion in the Crawford15 case. It was affirmed 6-3, 
with the conservatives and Stevens in the majority.16 On my court, the 
vote was 2-1. The question was whether the Indiana voter ID law 
disenfranchised too many legitimate voters. On the other side was the 
interest in protecting against voter fraud. There was no evidence on 
either side. What ended up being decisive in the end in the thinking of 
the majority in my case (and this is reflected in our opinion) was 
simply that we didn’t want to micromanage state election laws. If we 
got into that business, where would we stop? 
QUESTION: In our seminar, we have been reading a number of 
articles coming out of the modern legal origins literature that seem to 
build on your early work on the efficiency of the common law.17 Our 
sense from your more recent writing, though, is that your current 
 
 14. The questioner is David F. Levi, Dean of the Duke University School of Law and 
former Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. 
 15. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 
1610 (2008). 
 16. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (Stevens, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. & Kennedy, J., 
announcing the judgment of the Court); id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas & Alito, JJ., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 17. E.g., Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453 (2003); Daniel Klerman & Paul 
J. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from 18th Century England, 7 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 1 (2005); Paul J. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek 
Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001). 
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views diverge from those who have been asserting the efficiency of 
the common law and its superiority over civil law. Is that so? 
JUDGE POSNER: Much of my academic writing has been devoted to 
trying to explain common law doctrines and procedures on economic 
grounds; that is a major theme of my book Economic Analysis of 
Law, now in its seventh edition. The idea that common law is more 
efficient than civil law goes back at least to Max Weber. Weber 
observed that English law seemed more supportive of commercial 
activity than civil law. He didn’t have a good answer for why, though. 
My sense is that it has to do with the fact that English judges were 
appointed from practice. They knew about and understood business 
interests. They had learned about the practicalities of commercial 
transactions as lawyers. Brian Simpson, for example, had argued that 
the common law was not as chaotic as it seemed, because of the 
common social backgrounds of the judges. And in most common law 
areas, it is rarely feasible for courts to advance other social policies 
than economic efficiency. The problem with civil judges is that they 
are insulated from real judging. And there isn’t the luxury of 
academic leisure to study and learn. 
The problem with the claims in the legal origins literature is the 
degree of path dependence assumed. It is just not clear why 
seventeenth-century colonial origins should matter quite so much. 
Forget the origins part. The fact is that there are different political 
cultures. The European civil law systems are so much more legalistic 
and bureaucratic. You are a judge all your professional life. 
QUESTION: Could you talk about your view of international law and 
the use of materials from other jurisdictions? Should the use of those 
external materials not be more important? 
JUDGE POSNER: Legal cultures are very different. It is treacherous to 
assume that a foreign culture, and its corresponding legal system, 
should bear upon what we do. What the Israeli Supreme Court does, 
for example, is not useful. There is no real legal structure there. The 
government is corrupt and dysfunctional, and judges perforce fill the 
void: they are “good government” and are respected accordingly, and 
this enhances their political power. In other words, the reason the 
judges have so much power in that context is that they are honest and 
the politicians are corrupt. It is a different world out there. It is fine to 
read those foreign opinions, but not to use them as authority. 
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Think of capital punishment. It might be abolished as a formal 
matter in a hundred countries, yet some of them might be 
implementing capital punishment extrajudicially. Referring to the 
foreign decisions for the most part is little more than fig leafing. If 
you allow judges more sources of authority, you give them more 
discretion. 
In the book, I also emphasized the selectivity with which these 
foreign decisions or rules are cited in our courts. For example, most 
countries are more conservative than we are on abortion rights. So, in 
that context, judges tend not to look to foreign courts for authority. 
But they do with respect to the death penalty. 
QUESTION: Your book discusses a vast literature of empirical studies 
of judicial behavior. Why do you think judges do not pay more 
attention to that literature? 
JUDGE POSNER: A big problem is that most studies are not done by 
lawyers. When you read something by someone in a different field, 
you tend to discount it. I was just reading an article by the political 
scientist, Harold Spaeth, who has done a ton of empirical work on the 
topic of judicial behavior.18 His article talked about Bentham and 
Holmes in ways that lawyers and legal academics would probably find 
inadequate and frustrating. Now, that portion of his article was not 
that important to his actual study. But it grates lawyers to see that he 
does not take seriously what they consider important. And that 
becomes a tempting and convenient way to dismiss everything else he 
says because we have already decided that he is an outsider who 
doesn’t understand what we do. 
There are perhaps two other reasons. First, judges and law 
professors have an investment in thinking that the judicial process is 
technical and legalistic. The political science model undermines that. 
Second, judges aren’t sure how they should respond to this work. 
They think rightly or wrongly that they are doing the best they can. 
So, what do they do if faced with the results of political-science 
studies? They don’t really see the payoff. If you can tell them 
 
 18. E.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY 
WILL passim (1999) (contending that Justices privilege their preexisting views of the law over 
precedent when deciding cases); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL passim (1993) (arguing that Justices implement policy 
preferences in their decisions). 
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something useful that they could use in their work—something that 
would help them do their job better—that could help. Maybe they 
would pay attention to that. 
I’ll mention a couple of studies that I am working on with Lee 
Epstein and Bill Landes. One has to do with the question of why 
judges do not dissent more. Judges do not dissent every time there is 
a disagreement about the outcome of a case. So, the question is, what 
do you get out of dissenting and what do you lose? This is a question 
that judges ask when they have to make the choice about whether to 
dissent. If our study can produce convincing evidence on the costs and 
benefits (not pecuniary of course) of dissent, perhaps it will change 
behavior. 
It turns out that dissents are very rarely cited. A judge might 
want to know that. Supreme Court Justices dissent a lot. They have 
much more time to do so because of their control of their docket. 
Also, the Supreme Court pays less attention to precedent. On the 
court of appeals, we have a lot less time for dissenting, and we pay 
more attention to precedent and so are less likely to overrule a case 
on the basis that it contained a forceful dissent. 
A second study that we are doing is of judges asking questions 
during oral argument. It turns out that you can predict the outcome of 
a case by looking at the pattern of questioning. The side that is asked 
more questions tends to lose. 
The initial thinking on a case tends to be important, probably 
more so on the court of appeals than on the Supreme Court. On the 
court of appeals, we have our conference and then we discuss the 
cases. The vote there is tentative, but tends to have momentum. At 
conference, the judges vote in reverse order of seniority (it is the 
opposite in the Supreme Court). The senior judge worries that if the 
two others disagree, there is going to be an uphill battle to change 
their minds. 
The questions asked at oral argument are a way of talking to the 
other judges. If judges understood this better, it might affect how they 
behave in oral argument. 
I dissent rarely. I go along sometimes even when I disagree. Our 
disagreement may simply reflect differences in our experience. If you 
don’t have great confidence that you are necessarily right, you won’t 
dissent as much. 
The conversation among lawyers, judges, and political scientists 
might improve if law schools hired more political scientists who do 
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research on judicial behavior. Lee Epstein, a political scientist whose 
appointment is at Northwestern Law School, is a good example. 
Being in a law school environment exposes her to the institutional 
details that lawyers and judges consider. 
QUESTION: Your book talks about the value of looking to judicial 
biographies as a source of insight into the behavior of judges. But 
biographies of judges, particularly Supreme Court Justices, tend to be 
written by their former law clerks or other people who are close to 
them. And that might mean that the stories being told are biased. 
Wouldn’t it be better to have scholars do in-depth case studies of 
judges? 
JUDGE POSNER: I thought something like my book on Cardozo19 was 
more useful as a way of studying judicial behavior than full-length 
biographies, but the suggestion hasn’t been picked up. Andy 
Kaufman’s biography of Cardozo,20 though lengthy, is the best of the 
judicial biographies. Bruce Murphy’s biography of Douglas21 is also 
good, though it has inaccuracies. I published an article on judicial 
biography some years ago, Judicial Biography,22 that you might find 
useful. 
QUESTION: But it is hard to imagine any judge allowing a researcher 
to do a case study. Judges appear to want to preserve the mystique of 
what goes on in their chambers. 
JUDGE POSNER: I think you are being unduly skeptical. Judges might 
be willing to open up their chambers to researchers. I would be open 
to that. If there is less mystique about what happens with judges and 
their decisionmaking, advocates would be able to make better 
arguments. 
QUESTION: What about research on state courts? 
JUDGE POSNER: The state courts are interesting. I recently gave a 
talk to a group of state court judges. It was an annual meeting for 
 
 19. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1993). 
 20. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998). 
 21. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. 
DOUGLAS (2003). 
 22. Richard A. Posner, Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 502 (1995). 
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state court judges and it was fascinating. They had this interesting and 
funny issue come up with respect to elections of judges. Imagine you 
are the judge in a county and you can be assigned to another county. 
If it is the period before an election, some of the judges said, you will 
want to get assigned elsewhere. The goal, if you are standing for 
reelection, is to avoid scrutiny. The goal in getting elected is to avoid 
negative attention, to be invisible. Apparently, the incentives are not 
to affirmatively show that one is doing a good job. The incentives are 
to avoid being blamed for the decision on some case in the short 
period before an election where people are paying at least some 
attention. Most of the time, there is no attention paid. 
There is another angle on the study of judges that came up in my 
conversations with these state judges. Some judges asked me about 
specialized business courts and whether they were a good thing. The 
question, therefore, is one on how to study and compare those 
jurisdictions where there are business courts and those where there 
are not. It may be that there is less removal to federal district courts 
in contexts where there is the availability of a specialized business 
court. Or, there may be a greater fraction of people who choose 
arbitration in their contracts. It would be interesting to find out 
whether local businesses know about the quality of their local 
judiciary. Do they care? Lots of specialized business judging is just a 
timing thing. 
QUESTION: You have been writing about judicial behavior for over 
three decades. In your early articles on judicial behavior, you typically 
had clear and simple models of judicial behavior. The model you 
describe in this book is so much more complicated. Have your views 
about judges and judging changed significantly since those early 
articles? 
JUDGE POSNER: After thirty years, my views have changed 
significantly. I’ll give you an example. Bill Landes and I wrote about 
diversity jurisdiction years ago. One sentence in the draft said 
something about judges not working hard. I changed it, said it was 
obviously false. I had clerked and had observed that some judges 
didn’t work that hard, but I thought that others worked hard, surely 
they must have been. I was just deceived. 
I also exaggerated the formalist commitments of judges in those 
early articles. Law clerks come away with a very unrealistic view of 
judges. 
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QUESTION: After thirty years on the bench, you are a long way from 
your days as a clerk. Do you find yourself getting bored? 
JUDGE POSNER: Not at all. The work is not boring. The variety of 
cases is amazing and the mix of those cases keeps changing. This is 
especially the case with the civil docket. Immigration, child 
pornography, intellectual property—all of these have become big 
sources of cases. Plus, rarely is there an appeal without uncertainty 
about the legal issue. The work continues to be interesting. 
Maybe in the future I will try to sit by designation on some of the 
other courts. The First Circuit is a good court and I have friends 
there, like Michael Boudin. It would be interesting to see how the 
other circuits operate and what their practices are. In particular, 
judges may vary in terms of their management styles. Justice Powell 
had a whole system where the clerks took turns on revising the 
opinion and making sure it fit a certain structure and style. And the 
clerks had different roles and different responsibilities; the 
production of opinions was highly formalized. That strikes me as 
awful. Surely, many judges cannot be using such a structure. 
 
